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From Protection to Repression: The Politics of Street Vending in Kampala*† 
 
Abstract:  The political evolution of Kampala under the National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) has profoundly affected the fortunes of the city’s street vendors. 
This article examines the effects of institutional changes brought about by the 
NRM’s efforts to monopolize power in the city, arguing that the twin forces of 
democratization and decentralization allowed street vending to flourish while the 
reversal of these processes precipitated its dramatic decline. Democratization and 
decentralization initiated a period of intense political competition in which vendors 
could trade political support for protection from politicians who were more interested 
in political survival than the implementation of policy. This ability was lost when the 
central government introduced a new city government that shifted the balance of 
power from elected politicians to appointed technocrats. The new city government 
has since sought legitimacy through development and urban management initiatives 
that aim to transform Kampala into a supposedly modern, well-organized city. In 
doing so, it has sought to eradicate street vending, a practice it sees as the antithesis 
of and an obstacle to its ambitions. Lacking the channels for political influence that 
they previously enjoyed, street vendors have been forced to face the full brunt of 
government repression. 
 
Keywords: Street Vending; Informal Economy; Kampala; Democratization; Decentralization; 
Urban Development 
 
Street vending has long been a major feature of Kampala’s economic and physical 
landscape. As in so many other African cities, the practice serves as a key livelihood strategy for 
a segment of the urban poor for whom formal employment is unattainable and low entry costs 
are particularly appealing. A combination of high population growth, inadequate job creation and 
few protections for the unemployed and economically vulnerable means that for many, the 
unregulated sale of goods on city streets offers the only viable means of participating in a rapidly 
growing urban economy. It is a life of social and economic marginalization, but for an already 
disenfranchised group, the income that it provides is crucial.  
The nature of street vending makes it fundamentally inseparable from the political 
environment in which it takes place. It is with the state that vendors must negotiate access to the 
public space that they depend on for their livelihoods, and it is the state’s aspirations for urban 
management and development that street vendors must contend with or try to insert themselves 
into. The relationship that street vendors have with the state can define their very existence: if the 
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state is accommodating, vendors can be free to trade on the streets with minimal hindrance and 
assert their right to participate in an urban economy from which they are otherwise excluded; if, 
on the other hand, the state is more hostile, then street vendors can face repression and active 
attempts to eradicate their activities, perpetuating their marginalization. This relationship is not 
merely static, but evolves over time as political conditions change and the ability of street 
vendors to influence decision-making expands and contracts as a result. The significance of such 
changes is particularly notable in Kampala, where street vendors have been profoundly impacted 
by the political evolution of the city under the National Resistance Movement (NRM).  
This article explores how efforts by the NRM to monopolize political power in Kampala 
have defined the modern history of street vending in the city. It argues that political space in 
Kampala opened significantly as a result of the democratization and decentralization programs 
that the NRM introduced as a means of pursuing legitimacy after coming to power, and then 
closed when the central government reversed democratization and decentralization by taking 
over the city’s government. Democratization and decentralization created a situation where a 
newly empowered city government, the Kampala City Council (KCC), was controlled by the 
opposition, and where major divisions between the opposition and the NRM led to an intense 
competition for popular support that street vendors were able to take advantage of as a key 
voting demographic. Seeking to regain control of the city, the central government replaced the 
KCC with a new city government, the Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA), that is largely 
under the control of centrally appointed technocrats rather than elected politicians. Since the 
introduction of the KCCA, these technocrats have sought to secure their control over policy 
formation and implementation, further marginalizing elected officials. As a means of justifying 
its existence, the KCCA has introduced ambitious development and urban management 
initiatives aimed at transforming Kampala into a supposedly modern, orderly and well 
functioning city. Street vending, which has been framed as an embodiment of urban chaos, 
uncleanliness, insecurity and a lack of economic order—the antithesis of everything the KCCA 
stands for—has been banned and vendors face significant repression, while the closed political 
space that exists under the KCCA has meant that street vendors no longer have the ability to 
improve their conditions by exercising political influence.  
The repression of street vending in Sub-Saharan Africa and beyond has received a 
considerable amount of scholarly attention. Studies often highlight the importance of 
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colonialism, neoliberalism, development, urban governance and arguments about aesthetics and 
economic efficiency in efforts to remove vendors from city streets, suggesting that street vendors 
are commonly seen as undesirable as they violate dominant understandings of how and by whom 
urban space should be used.1 This article builds on these arguments by stressing how the 
repression of street vending can follow from broader institutional changes that are fundamentally 
driven by questions of political power and control. In Kampala, street vending was able to thrive 
as a result of reforms that the NRM introduced to solidify its position after coming to power; 
when the NRM later reversed these reforms and adopted an exclusionary form of urban 
management and development in an effort to regain control of the city, street vending suffered a 
precipitous decline. Since the KCCA adopted its ban on street vending in 2011, the number of 
vendors on the streets of Kampala has fallen from a total of 8,500 by perhaps 80-90%, while 
those who remain regularly face harassment, fines, arrests and imprisonment.2 This dramatic 
change of fortune can only be understood in the context of the city’s modern political history.  
Following a brief overview of current literature on street vending in Sub-Saharan Africa 
and outline of its methodological approach, this article begins by exploring how the 
democratization and decentralization reforms introduced by the NRM dramatically reshaped the 
politics of Kampala, and how these new political realities allowed street vendors to remain on the 
city’s streets by providing them with the opportunity to take advantage of a competitive political 
environment dominated by self-interested politicians. It then details how the ruling party 
subsequently reversed democratization and decentralization by replacing the KCC with the 
KCCA, and, by focusing on the politics of the KCCA between the 2011 and 2016 elections, 
describes how locally elected officials have been marginalized from decision-making. The extent 
to which the ruling party has justified its takeover of the city based on its apparent ability to 
promote development and undertake effective urban management is particularly emphasized. 
The final section of this article examines how the form of development and urban management 
that the KCCA has implemented has led to the repression of street vendors as undesirable 
elements of a modern urban landscape and economy, and how the organization’s de-
democratized and highly centralized structure has robbed street vendors of the ability to exert the 
political influence that they previously enjoyed.  
 
Street vending in Sub-Saharan Africa 
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 Street vendors throughout Sub-Saharan Africa are commonly forced to contend with state 
efforts to regulate, limit or prohibit their activities.3 Current literature often focuses on the 
strategies that street vendors employ to negotiate access to urban space when confronted by the 
coercive power of the state, detailing how vendors respond to arrests, fines and relocation efforts 
by, inter alia, engaging in organizational advocacy, evading or bribing authorities, concealing 
merchandise, increasing mobility, establishing lookout and warning systems, selling at times of 
low police presence, switching activities after goods have been seized and returning to the streets 
following periods of repression.4 This work has provided valuable insights into the resilience and 
adaptability of a particularly vulnerable segment of the urban poor, and represents an important 
contribution to understandings of the broader struggles that define informal livelihood strategies 
across the continent.5  
 Rather than focusing on how vendors respond to state repression, this article instead turns 
its attention to how patterns of inclusion and exclusion are transformed over time as institutions 
and political circumstances evolve, and how this evolution is fundamentally driven by questions 
of power that dominate the interests of politicians and state officials. The central role that 
institutions play in shaping the politics of street vending has been highlighted by Skinner, whose 
comparative analysis of local government in South Africa and work on the changing treatment of 
street vendors in Durban since the end of apartheid offer a particularly valuable point of 
reference,6 and by Riley, who demonstrates the extent to which a flawed decentralization process 
and problems with the construction of local democratic institutions, along with the formation of a 
new governing party and the transformation of patronage networks, contributed to Operation 
Dongosolo, a major effort to eradicate street vending in Malawi in 2006.7 More generally, Brown 
and Lyons identify the institutional environment in which vendors’ organizations operate as a 
critical determinant of their ability to exercise political influence and counter repression.8 This 
article contributes to this line of enquiry by exploring a case in which institutional and political 
transformation driven by the desire to monopolize power has had a severe and lasting impact on 
the fortunes of street vendors. The story of the decline of street vending in Kampala is the story 
of the politics of the city itself.      
 
Methodology 
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This article combines primary and secondary research on the politics of street vending in 
Kampala. Semi-structured interviews were conducted with over 130 street vendors, government 
officials, civil society leaders, relevant professionals and other members of the city’s informal 
economy in 2015. Respondents were asked a variety of questions surrounding the modern 
political history of Kampala and the changing role of street vending in the city’s social, 
economic, political and physical landscape, and their answers provide the foundation of the 
arguments presented here.  
Secondary research took two forms. First, major pieces of legislation and government 
documents were analyzed as a means of tracking how the nature and constitution of the state, as 
well as key internal state structures and policies, have evolved over time. This analysis plays an 
essential role in the descriptions of how political changes at both the national and local level 
have impacted street vendors in Kampala. Second, a comprehensive search through the archives 
of the country’s two major daily newspapers, New Vision and The Daily Monitor, was also 
undertaken to complement insights gained from fieldwork and other documentary analysis, 
allowing a full picture of the politics of street vending in the city to emerge. 
  
Democratization, decentralization and street vending under the Kampala City Council 
Democratization and decentralization have been two key features of Uganda’s political 
evolution under the NRM. Seeking to secure its position after coming to power in 1986, the 
NRM built upon the system of Resistance Councils that it had established during the civil war to 
introduce a radically new form of participatory local governance. The principle of devolving 
powers “from higher to lower local government units” in order to “ensure peoples’ participation 
and democratic control in decision making” was enshrined in the country’s 1995 Constitution,9 
while the 1997 Local Governments Act formalized a five-tier system of Local Councils from the 
village (LC1) to the district/city level (LC5).10 The self-interest behind these reforms was clear: 
by constructing a seemingly inclusive system of government from the local to the national level, 
the NRM was able to expand its legitimacy and gain popular support throughout the country at 
the expense of traditional political parties, undermine calls for federalism by Baganda elites and 
secure crucial support from international donors.11 The NRM, of course, also strengthened its 
grip on power further by implementing democratization and decentralization in a way that 
allowed the central government to maintain significant control over all levels of local 
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government under a system of effective one-party rule.12 Still, its reforms proved to be 
transformative.   
This is particularly true in Kampala.13 Within the LC hierarchy, the Kampala City 
Council (KCC) became a city council (LC5) with a directly elected mayor and 31 elected 
councillors, above five city divisions (LC3)—Central Division, Kawempe Division, Lubaga 
Division, Makindye Division and Nakawa Division—each of which also had its own elected 
chairperson and councillors. Below the city divisions were a further 99 parishes (LC2) and 811 
villages (LC1).14 The NRM also greatly expanded the powers of the KCC, devolving to it 80% of 
all services and leaving only national roads and secondary and post-secondary education under 
the control of the national government.15 Thus the twin processes of decentralization and 
democratization simultaneously gave the KCC more powers and autonomy over its affairs while 
also making its officials more subject to popular opinion and dependent on popular support. 
While the NRM continued to dominate both national politics and the Local Council 
system across the country, the opposition established itself as the leading political force in 
Kampala under the KCC. In 1998, the city’s first mayoral elections were won by multipartyist 
(the term for an opponent of the NRM’s ‘no-party’ political system) and populist Nasser Ntege 
Sebaggala, who defeated incumbent and NRM favourite Christopher Iga in what was commonly 
seen as a rejection of President Museveni.16 Following Sebaggala’s arrest and conviction in the 
United States for fraud related to forged traveller’s cheques, a by-election held in 1999 was won 
by John Ssebaana Kizito, another multipartyist, who was re-elected in 2002. Sebaggala, after 
returning to Kampala in 2000 to what the BBC described as a “hero’s welcome”, was again 
elected mayor in 2006.17 Both Sebaggala and Ssebaana were widely known to be supporters of 
the Democratic Party (DP), the primary opposition force in the city, but ran as multipartyists 
before 2006 since the DP could not officially field candidates under the country’s ‘no-party’ 
political system (and in 2006, Sebaggala ran as an independent due to conflicts with the DP 
leadership). The DP also controlled city council after the re-introduction of multi-party politics in 
2005; from 2006-2011, 17 KCC councillors were DP members, 11 represented the NRM and 
three (including the mayor) were independents. 
The opposition’s power, however, was constantly challenged by the NRM, turning the 
KCC into what an article in the Daily Monitor referred to as “Uganda’s main political 
battleground.”18 This mainly occurred in two ways: first, through direct interference, particularly 
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by the President, in matters under the KCC’s authority; and second, by denying the KCC 
essential funding and sources of revenue that it needed to properly function. These conflicts 
significantly undermined the KCC’s ability to address the various developmental and urban 
management challenges that it faced, a reality that was often lamented by local politicians, 
including both Sebaggala and Ssebaana.19 Traffic congestion, poor roads and inadequate local 
service delivery such as garbage collection were constant problems in the city, while the KCC 
also oversaw the growth of informal structures and slum areas, the proliferation of boda-bodas 
(motorcycle taxis) and matatus (mini-buses), controversies surrounding the privatization of the 
city’s markets and, as explored here, conflicts over street vending.20 Indeed, the growth of 
Kampala under the KCC occurred in such a way that one politician referred to the city, in a 
frequently quoted phrase, as a “modern executive slum”.21  
It is not simply the case, however, that the opposition-led KCC regularly attempted to 
implement forms of urban management that were ultimately and consistently undermined by the 
NRM. While this certainly occurred, the defining political reality of the KCC is that divisions 
between the NRM and the opposition in Kampala caused crucial issues pertaining to the 
government of the city to become politicized, and also caused concerns surrounding political 
advantage to supersede those of policy formation and implementation. This made politicians 
particularly dependent on popular support that was often tied to their willingness to further 
interests that were unrelated to governance. Such a reality provided space for street vendors to 
exercise political agency.  
Street vending was officially regulated by the KCC. At a national level, the Trade 
(Licensing) Act of 1969 mandated that street vendors must possess a licence from a local 
authority outlining the type of goods they could sell, the area in which they could operate, the 
hours during which they could be on the street and “such other conditions as the [local] licensing 
authority may think fit to impose.”22 A license could be refused or revoked at any time, was valid 
for a year and had to be produced upon request.23 The KCC sought to implement further 
regulatory measures. It ordered vendors to be evicted in December 2000,24 then did so again in 
July 200125 and September 2001.26 In April 2002, the KCC undertook Operation Safe City, a 
major effort to remove vendors from the city’s streets.27 Vendors largely complied with minimal 
confrontation,28 while those who did not faced prosecution.29 In 2006, the KCC passed the Local 
Governments (Kampala City Council) (Maintenance of Law and Order) Ordinance, which 
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banned all forms of street vending for those lacking official permits.30 The Town Clerk (the local 
administrative chief) again banned street vending in October 2010.31  
Despite these efforts, street vending was still common under the KCC. Vendors were 
occasionally harassed, and periodic attempts to remove them from the city’s streets certainly 
occurred, but orders to leave the streets were often ignored, or if they were followed, vendors 
would quickly return. It was the politics of the KCC that allowed this to happen. In a competitive 
electoral environment, KCC politicians effectively entered into what Tendler elsewhere calls a 
‘devil’s deal’ in which promises of protection are traded for political support from informal 
actors.32 In simple terms, politicians and vendors in the city entered a tacit—and sometimes 
explicit—agreement in which access to space was effectively exchanged for votes; politicians, 
seeking advantage in Kampala’s highly contested local politics and with the power to influence 
policy implementation, were willing to relax or undermine enforcement as a means of 
strengthening their political positions, allowing street vendors to use their position as a key 
voting demographic to pursue their political objectives. As a result, laws against street vending 
were inconsistently enforced by politicians who valued their positions of power more highly than 
city streets free of vendors.33 Vendors were aware of their own power when faced with evictions; 
Sebaggala himself reflected on the political pressure that street vendors could exert, complaining 
“Whenever I wanted to evict people who were trading in illegal areas, they would threaten that 
they would not vote for me again.”34 The demands of staying in office and gaining the upper 
hand in the constant struggles between the NRM and the opposition outweighed any concerns 
about eradicating street vending.   
Street vendors also organized under the KCC to exercise their political agency. In fact, 
KCC officials supported organization as a means of facilitating revenue collection, promising 
further support.35 Street vendors who worked in shared geographic areas often organized in 
groups of various sizes, with the largest having at least a few dozen members who would elect 
leaders to serve specific administrative functions. These larger associations would support 
politicians who offered favourable treatment, and could also communicate with elected officials, 
particularly the mayor, on issues of primary importance to street vendors, including access to 
space, arrests, cleanliness and security. Politicians would not only offer protection and seek to 
solve conflicts in vendors’ favour, but would also sometimes offer financial support for vendors 
to cover costs such as school fees. Associations would also organize revenue payments, and 
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organize and assist payments on behalf of members related to permits, debts and bills in the 
event of illness or death.36 They had certain disciplinary functions as well, ensuring that only 
“honest” vendors were able to sell in their areas of influence.37 
The NRM’s democratization and, with decentralization, political empowerment of the 
KCC therefore had a profound effect on the agency of street vendors in Kampala. By giving 
local politicians extensive powers over the city’s development and making them reliant on 
popular support for their positions, reforms created a political situation in which street vendors 
were able to leverage the support they could provide in exchange for favourable treatment from 
local authorities. The legal restrictions and occasional evictions that vendors in the city faced 
demonstrate the type of ambivalence that characterizes treatments of street vendors in a wide 
variety of settings.38 That ambivalence, however, was dependent upon the peculiarities of the 
political realities that existed in Kampala. When these realities changed, the ambivalence 
disappeared.  
 
The introduction of the Kampala Capital City Authority and the National Resistance 
Movement’s reassertion of power 
 If decentralization and democratization precipitated the rise of street vending in Kampala 
under the KCC, then a reversal of these processes led to its decline under a new recentralized, 
less democratic city government. The repression of street vending followed directly from the 
central government’s takeover of the city, with the KCCA pursuing a form of development and 
urban management that excluded street vendors and street vendors lacking the opportunity for 
political influence due to the reduced space for political competition in a less democratic system 
of local government. The ‘devil’s deal’ that street vendors were able to profit from under the 
KCC all but disappeared under the KCCA; no longer able to trade their political support for 
protection, vendors saw their space for agency greatly reduced.   
 
The Kampala Capital City Authority, 2011-2016 
The opposition’s control of Kampala instilled in the central government a longstanding 
desire to take over the KCC and bring the city back under the direct control of the NRM. Both 
the President and supportive Members of Parliament (MPs) publicly expressed a desire to do so 
as early as 2001.39 Under Article 202 of Uganda’s 1995 Constitution, the President, with the 
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approval of two-thirds of MPs, had the power to “assume the executive and legislative powers of 
any district” under the following conditions: “(a) where the district council so requests it and it is 
in the public interest to do so; (b) where a state of emergency has been declared in that district or 
in Uganda generally; or (c) where it has become extremely difficult or impossible for the district 
government to function.”40 Vague references to public interest and proper government 
functioning suggest that considerable room for interpretation surrounding the use of this power 
existed. The Constitution also stipulated, however, that the use of this power was to be 
temporary; the President could theoretically extend his control indefinitely,41 but the 
constitutionally stated final objective was to return power to the local government.42 This was 
not conducive to permanent political dominance.  
The central government therefore needed a new legal basis on which to justify its 
takeover of Kampala. This came with The Constitutional (Amendment) Act of 2005, the same 
document that legislated a return to multipartyism and repealed Presidential term limits, making 
the central government’s reassertion of power in Kampala an important part of the apparent 
trade-off that brought an end to the Movement system.43 Under Uganda’s amended constitution, 
Kampala is listed as a distinct entity that is not classified with other regions and districts, thereby 
making it no longer subject to the provisions that apply to either,44 and is to be “administered by 
the central government” subject to provisions adopted by Parliament.45 In June 2009, Local 
Government Minister Adolf Mwesige presented to Parliament what would become, when 
eventually passed in November 2010, The Kampala Capital City Authority Act (KCCA Act).  
The KCCA Act, in its final form, outlined the structure of the KCCA. The basic 
hierarchal structure of the local government system was maintained, as were some of the key 
features of the KCC, most notably the existence of a directly elected mayor, now with the title of 
‘Lord Mayor’, along with 34 elected councillors (now with four elected by and to represent 
engineers, architects, doctors and lawyers).46 The position of Lord Mayor, however, was given 
reduced powers, assigned such functions as presiding over meetings, hosting dignitaries, 
monitoring administration, assisting in the administration of city divisions and performing 
“ceremonial functions and civic functions”, although, significantly, it was also given the power 
to “head the Authority in developing strategies and programmes” for development.47 Much of the 
true power in the KCCA was to instead rest in the newly created position of Executive Director, 
the “chief executive” of the KCCA appointed by the President.48 The Executive Director was to 
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be the head of the public service and administration, and among its various functions (23 
outlined in the KCCA Act, compared to only eight for the Lord Mayor), was to oversee the 
KCCA’s finances and assets, implement policy, enforce ordinances and byelaws, oversee service 
delivery and “mobilise the urban community for development and sustainability of infrastructure 
and services”.49 The Executive Director was also supposed to “advise the mayor and Authority 
on Government policy” and “liaise with the central Government and other institutions on behalf 
of the Authority”, tying the position even further to the central government.50 Both the Lord 
Mayor and Executive Director were to have deputies.51 Even with the presence of the Executive 
Director, there was also still to be a Resident City Commissioner (RCC) with the responsibility 
to “represent the President and the government”.52 
Finally, there was to be a Minister for the KCCA in Parliament with the power to “give 
directives on policy and general development”, “vary or rescind” decisions that are “in 
contravention of any law or Government policy” and “receive or take appropriate action” on 
reports submitted by the Lord Mayor, the Executive Director or a commission of inquiry.53 The 
Lord Mayor was to be answerable to the Minister and to the KCCA as a whole in the 
performance of his or her functions.54 As a Member of Cabinet appointed by the President, the 
KCCA Minister’s ties to the central government were, like those of the Executive Director, also 
obvious.  
The central government’s takeover of Kampala was unsurprisingly met with resistance. 
Most notably, Sebaggala and Kampala Central MP Erias Lukwago criticized the move as a 
cynical and politically motivated attempt by the NRM to regain control of the city after long 
being unable to do so through electoral means.55 Sebaggala also warned that it would undermine 
the central government’s decentralization efforts, and suggested that what the KCC truly needed 
was not to be replaced, but to be adequately funded and free from political interference.56 It was 
not just opposition politicians who were against the change. A poll conducted in 2008 found that 
of the 33% of Ugandans who were aware of the central government’s plans, 38% approved and 
59% disapproved. Divisions were also notable across party lines: of the three main opposition 
parties, 91% of DP supporters, 69% of Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) supporters and 68% of 
Forum for Democratic Change (FDC) supporters disapproved of the takeover, as did 63% of 
independents and those supporting other parties, and, interestingly, 44% of NRM supporters.57  
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The KCCA was introduced on March 1, 2011.58 Although Kampala has traditionally been 
a stronghold of the opposition (particularly the DP), the NRM actually won the most council 
seats in the 2011 local elections. The DP also failed to win the mayor’s office in each of the 
city’s five divisions, and won fewer division council seats than the NRM in all divisions except 
for Lubaga. This can probably be explained in a large part by dissatisfaction with the DP’s 
performance in managing the city. Still, support for the opposition was strong, and most notably 
expressed with the election of Erias Lukwago, the former MP for Kampala Central and a major 
opposition figure with the support of both popular opposition leader Kizza Besigye and the FDC, 
to the position of Lord Mayor with 64.41% of the vote.59 Jennifer Musisi, a lawyer with a 
background at the Uganda Revenue Authority, was appointed to the position of Executive 
Director by Museveni in 2011. Although Musisi was a technocrat rather than a politician, the 
unofficial requirement of sympathy for and a willingness to co-operate with the NRM in order to 
secure an appointment by the President is obvious. Beatrice Wabudeya, the Minister for the 
Presidency, was also named Minister for the KCCA in 2011, and was replaced in both these 
positions by Kabakumba Masiko, another NRM MP, who served until December of that year, 
being replaced, again in both positions, by Wilson Muruli Mukasa, a third NRM MP. Frank 
Tumwebaze, an NRM MP for Kibale County in Kamwenge District in Western Uganda, was 
appointed as both Minister for the Presidency and Minister for the KCCA in August 2012. The 
overlap of the two ministerial positions is particularly revealing about the close ties between 
Museveni and the KCCA hierarchy.  
The NRM’s efforts to expand its power in Kampala have continued after the introduction 
of the KCCA. While the KCCA has made the party (and, by extension, the central government) 
the dominant political force in the city, the fact that some positions in the city government are 
elected means that this dominance is not complete. This is something that the ruling party has 
sought to rectify, leading to conflicts between the political (elected) and technocratic (appointed) 
wings of the organization. The city’s division mayors, including those belonging to the NRM, 
along with councillors within both the KCCA and city divisions have complained that Musisi 
and the technocratic wing make and impose decisions unilaterally.60 These particularly took the 
form of the technocratic wing, led by Executive Director Musisi, attempting to expand its power 
at the expense of the political wing, led by Lord Mayor Lukwago. Lukwago has been an 
outspoken opposition figure throughout his career. He has also been a prominent champion of 
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the city’s urban poor. This has made him extremely popular. As an MP he criticized both the 
performance of the KCC and the introduction of the KCCA, and later referred to his election as 
Lord Mayor as “a battle between me and the state” in which he “defeated President Museveni 
and the NRM rigging machinery”.61 This victory, however, was short-lived. Lukwago quickly 
accused Musisi of overstepping her authority as Executive Director, claiming that she acted to 
construct and impose policies despite the fact that the KCCA Act, in his view, invested those 
powers within the body’s political wing.62 This led to major disputes between the Lord Mayor 
and Executive Director about their respective powers within the KCCA, culminating in 
Lukwago’s impeachment on November 25, 2013 for abuse of office, incompetence and 
misconduct or misbehaviour.63 Councillors who voted for Lukwago’s impeachment reportedly 
received millions of shillings, along with young chickens and chicken feed, from the President.64 
The decision was met protests in Kampala that were forcefully suppressed by the police.65  
The contrast between the realities of the KCCA and the NRM’s earlier stated 
commitment to decentralization and democratization is stark. The KCC was relatively 
autonomous and democratic, but this allowed it to be dominated by the popular opposition. 
Faced with a choice between political control and its twin programs of decentralization and 
democratization in Kampala, the central government emphatically chose the former, 
recentralizing power and de-democratizing the city through the KCCA. The politics of the city 
have been dramatically transformed as a result.  
 
Development and urban management 
It is crucial to stress the primary role that arguments about development and effective 
urban management played in justifying the introduction of the KCCA. The idea that the KCC 
was failing to adequately manage and oversee the development of the city was commonly held, 
and was, of course, tied to the political struggles that dominated the city: first, since politicians 
often pursued political advantage over governance functions; and second, because the central 
government could undermine the effectiveness of the KCC, then use this ineffectiveness to point 
to the KCC’s failure and its own obligation to replace a democratically elected government.  
The logic of development and urban management featured prominently in the KCCA 
Act. Mwesige described the bill he presented to Parliament as “development-oriented”, 
obviously implied to contrast with the performance of the KCC.66 Not only were the Lord Mayor 
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and Executive Director given powers concerning the development and, particularly for the latter, 
management of the city, but a key feature of the KCCA was to be a new Metropolitan Physical 
Planning Authority to direct development in the city. The Metropolitan Physical Planning 
Authority, however, was never established, but a Physical Planning Committee was set up in 
accordance with the country’s Physical Planning Act of 2010, and a detailed development plan 
for transforming Kampala into “a Modern, Functional Balanced City and Metropolitan System” 
was approved by the National Physical Planning Board in 2013.67  
The KCCA wasted little time acting on its developmental and urban management 
ambitions. Many of the steps that it has taken have surrounded the performance of administrative 
duties, such as processing building plans, issuing permits and inspecting construction sites.68 It 
has also focused on high visibility “cosmetic projects” such as garbage collection and planting 
trees in order to demonstrate, according to one civil society leader, “that Kampala City, under the 
management of the opposition, was poor, compared to Kampala City under the management of 
the President and the Executive Director”.69 Many of the KCCA’s efforts, however, have been 
far more interventionist and coercive, perhaps most notably:  
 
• The demolition of illegal structures around the city where owners lack proper 
permits and approval, including residences and commercial buildings;  
• The eviction of tenants from places that serve important public functions, 
including Centenary Park, the city’s wetlands and areas along the city’s railway 
lines (with the railway line evictions alone affecting 40,000 people);70 
• The demolition of traders’ structures at such places as Luzira Stage Seven Market 
and the Old Taxi Park;  
• Attempts to ban boda-boda stages from the city centre and take over the 
management of the matatu industry;  
• Attempts to assume the management of and redevelop the city’s markets; and 
• The banning of begging on the city’s streets and removals of street children. 
 
The KCCA’s efforts to eliminate street vending have been underpinned by the same logic of 
urban management and development.  
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The repression of street vending 
The repression of street vending in Kampala follows directly from the introduction of the 
KCCA. The KCCA’s developmental ambitions caused it to commit to eradicating informal 
vending from the city’s streets, while its recentralized and de-democratized structure closed the 
political space that street vendors had formerly used to exercise political influence. Lacking the 
political protection that they were able to access under the KCC, street vendors in Kampala have 
faced a city government that is far more committed to the eradication of their activities.  
The Third Schedule of the KCCA Act gives the KCCA the power to “[p]rohibit, restrict, 
regulate or licence” street vending.71 The act also gives the Executive Director the power to 
“promote trade order” in the city,72 and the concept of ‘trade order’ is commonly referenced in 
the context of outlawing street vending. Ultimately, however, the KCCA justified its ban by 
invoking the 2006 ordinance passed by the KCC.73 This had two notable advantages: first, it 
meant that the KCCA did not need to pass its own legislation; and second, it served to contrast 
the effectiveness of the KCCA with the inability or unwillingness of the KCC to enforce its own 
adopted policies. Musisi announced a ban on street vendors in the city’s Central Business 
District on July 10 2011,74 and at the end of August the KCCA announced that vendors must 
vacate the city by September 4 or face evictions.75 Makiso, the Minister for the President and the 
KCCA, made a similar announcement on September 2.76 The decision was apparently made by 
the central government.77 
It is possible to identify four distinct arguments that are commonly employed to justify 
the KCCA’s ban on street vending:78 
 
1. Promoting cleanliness and order: street vendors are seen as a source of urban 
disorder and chaos who both are themselves unclean and make the city unclean with 
their presence. Such a view holds them to be not only detrimental to the city’s 
aesthetics, but also to the city’s proper and efficient functioning. A KCCA 
spokesperson claimed that the new city government “found the city in a mess” in 
2011, with the streets “littered with vendors causing unnecessary traffic congestion” 
and impeding pedestrians on city sidewalks.79 Removing street vendors, according to 
this logic, was therefore essential to the effective management of otherwise open, 
unoccupied public spaces. 
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2. Promoting security: street vending is also seen as a potential threat to public security. 
This often comes from the fear that street vendors may be criminals who could 
engage in petty thievery or even more serious crimes. The idea that criminals can 
pose as street vendors due to the low entry costs that characterize street vending has 
echoes in the similar (if more outlandish) fear that terrorists may do the same. 
Immediately before issuing the September 4, 2011 eviction deadline, Musisi said to 
journalists that “[i]n this era of terrorism and bomb threats”, the government must be 
able to “control and regulate the number of illegal street vendors”, suggestively 
adding that “no one knows the kind of merchandise they trade in.”80  
3. Ending unfair competition: by operating on the streets, vendors are free from the 
taxes, regulatory costs and business expenses (particularly rent) that are more easily 
or inescapably incurred by their counterparts in shops. They also have easy access to 
potential customers due to the visibility and accessibility that comes with occupying 
public spaces. This gives them a major competitive advantage over (more) formal 
businesses that may be forced to charge higher prices for similar goods and may 
struggle to attract customers due to less favourable locations (something that is 
particularly relevant for businesses outside of the city centre, off of major streets or 
inside the city’s indoor shopping arcades). Eradicating street vending would therefore 
benefit these businesses that ‘play by the rules’ by ensuring that they are no longer 
undercut by unfair competition.  
4. Improving revenue collection: forcing vendors off of the city’s streets and into 
markets could give them a more permanent position and ensure that they could be 
more effectively regulated and taxed. The KCC suffered from chronic financial 
problems that were in part caused by its poor performance in local revenue collection. 
The KCCA seeks to avoid the same fate.   
 
These arguments reflect the idea that street vendors have no place in the modern urban 
economy and physical landscape that the KCCA has pledged to create. With their associations 
with urban disorder, a lack of cleanliness, criminality, terrorism, poor business performance and 
low revenue intake, street vendors are seen to embody the problems that prevent Kampala from 
becoming a modern, developed, well-managed city. In the context of the city’s politics, they 
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were, in 2011, a visible manifestation of the KCC’s failure to promote development and 
undertake effective urban management; their removal, by contrast, would be a notable indication 
of the KCCA’s superior ability to run the city, the primary justification given for the central 
government’s takeover. The class dimensions of this logic are obvious: street vendors, as visible 
members of the urban poor, prevent the city from properly functioning for other residents by 
being visually unappealing, blocking traffic and pedestrians, posing a potential physical or 
monetary threat, undercutting businesses and undermining local government finances. Their 
livelihood needs are considered secondary to such concerns.81   
These class dimensions are particularly evident from the major role that the Kampala 
City Traders Association (KACITA) played in promoting the ban on street vending in Kampala. 
KACITA, as the primary organization representing the city’s traders, has long been a prominent 
opponent of street vending, regarding the practice as a source of unfair competition and an 
impediment to shop owners’ access to potential customers. According to a KACITA 
spokesperson, the organization lobbied the KCC to remove vendors from the city’s streets, but 
was unsuccessful because elected officials relied on street vendors for support. MPs and 
presidential candidates were apparently reluctant to act for the same reason. KACITA then 
lobbied Museveni, telling him to do a cost-benefit analysis of street vending that factored in 
revenue from taxes and licensing fees paid by formal businesses as well as potential security 
costs. The President was apparently persuaded by this logic, along with the fact that, with the 
2011 elections over, he no longer needed street vendors’ electoral support.82 Threats by KACITA 
to go on strike in September 2011 further pressured the KCCA to act to ban street vending when 
it did,83 just as a strike by traders to pressure the KCC into taking action in April 2002 was 
shortly followed by Operation Safe City.84  
KACITA’s efforts are in line with Cross’ observation that businesses turn to the coercive 
powers of the state when they are unable to eliminate street vending through market 
competition.85 What makes street vending so attractive and gives it its competitive advantage is 
precisely its low entry costs and minimal capital intensity, making it accessible to the urban poor 
in a way that owning a larger business in a shop, with all of the costs that this would entail, is 
not. Larger traders wish to eliminate this competitive advantage, but in doing so close off one of 
the only avenues that the urban poor have for participating in the city’s economy and securing a 
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basic livelihood. Since the central government’s takeover of the city, these traders, through the 
KCCA, have been able to get the state to intervene decisively on their behalf.  
Political divisions, of course, also shaped the KCCA’s ban on street vending. These cut 
across the obvious fault lines of power in the city under the KCCA: between the opposition and 
the ruling party, and between politicians and technocrats. Lukwago has been a particularly vocal 
critic of the evictions, accusing the KCCA of treating street vendors with an “iron fist”86 and 
arguing before the ban took effect that more time should be allowed for proper consultations to 
take place.87 A number of opposition MPs—although not all—opposed the eviction in 
Parliament on similar grounds, but a motion to suspend it failed due to a lack of quorum.88 
Lukwago also claimed that the decision to ban street vending was not properly discussed within 
the KCCA, leading to accusations that his powers were not adequately respected.89 This fuelled 
his conflict with Musisi and the KCCA’s technocratic wing, forming a key part of disputes 
surrounding the proper division of powers and issues of development and urban management. 
These disputes have allowed Lukwago’s opponents, including both Musisi and Museveni, to 
characterize him as an obstacle to development who stands in the way of the KCCA’s plans and 
wastes valuable time and resources, ultimately justifying his removal.  
Street vendors were largely seen to support Lukwago in his 2011 election victory, leading 
to speculation in the Daily Monitor as to whether or not this would be “his poisoned chalice 
when he moved to redeem the city” (that is, whether or not their support would prevent him from 
undertaking supposedly necessary evictions).90 In contrast to the KCC, however, the KCCA has 
been structured and operates in a way that renders the support of elected officials an ineffective 
way of exerting political influence. With the existence of the powerful technocratic wing that has 
taken over policy formation and implementation, along with continuous efforts to disempower 
the Lord Mayor, the KCCA imposes significant de jure and de facto restrictions on politicians 
that prevent them from coming to the aid of street vendors even when they desire to do so. 
Electoral competition has been minimized and its outcomes have been made less relevant, 
making the arrangement that existed under the KCC in which vendors could exchange electoral 
support for political protection practically impossible under the KCCA. Unelected technocrats 
are immune to such reasoning altogether, and because they derive their legitimacy from their 
ability to direct development and urban management, they have few reasons to sympathize with 
street vendors and strong reasons to pursue the eradication of street vending. As one (former) 
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street vendor leader described, when vendors wanted anything under the KCC “they would run 
to the Mayor, they would run to MPs, they would run to councillors, but now with KCCA, they 
don’t run to them because they don’t have the power.”91 The problem with the KCCA, another 
stated, is that “we have no right to vote for the Executive Director”, and therefore no longer have 
the ability to influence local government policy.92 A third agreed, lamenting that the KCCA gets 
its orders from the President, and therefore has “no need to listen to us”,93 while another vendor 
similarly complained that decisions now come “from the State House” rather than elected local 
officials.94 The introduction of the KCCA has reversed democratization and decentralization in 
Kampala, and limited the political influence of street vendors as a result.  
 
Conclusion: the future of repression 
Street vendors in Kampala have faced significant repression since the introduction of the 
KCCA. Evictions, arrests, the confiscation or destruction of goods, demands for bribes and other 
forms of harassment by KCCA officials have become ever-present threats for street vendors who 
now ply their trade illegally. The organizations that they formed have been co-opted by the 
KCCA or have been coerced into disbanding, while the ones that remain have no real hope of 
influencing policy. The decentralized, democratized political system that empowered street 
vendors simply no longer exists, and the politicians who supported them no longer have the 
power or incentives to do so. As a result, the number of street vendors in Kampala has decreased 
dramatically. Some are in prison, or have been forced to give up vending because the costs 
associated with it have become too burdensome. Many have relocated to one of the city’s 
informal markets, where they struggle with high fees and few customers. Others have left 
Kampala altogether, in many cases returning to the countryside after originally coming to the 
city in search of better economic opportunities. In short, street vendors have been excluded from 
the city’s development, and have few prospects for improving their positions in a highly 
politicized urban economy.  
The repression of street vendors shows little sign of ending. The 2016 elections saw 
Lukwago re-elected by an even larger margin than in 2011, while the NRM lost its majority of 
city council seats in the KCCA. Museveni too fared poorly, collecting fewer than half as many 
votes in Kampala as Besigye, his main rival, in his worst ever performance in the city.95 After his 
defeat in the city, Museveni suggested that the NRM may have performed so poorly in Kampala 
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due to the KCCA’s treatment of street vendors, and expressed his apparent displeasure with the 
fact that the evictions were carried out before a viable alternative for vendors to trading on the 
streets could be established.96 Street vendors apparently took these statements as a sign of 
support from Museveni, and returned to the city’s streets in large numbers. Still, these changes 
were not enough to alter the long-term fortunes of street vendors. KACITA, as it did in 2002 and 
2011, put pressure on the KCCA to carry out fresh evictions, which the KCCA did just weeks 
after the elections in an exercise that it dubbed ‘restoration of trade order and sanity’.97 Whatever 
opening of political space the elections provided for street vendors proved to be short-lived. The 
repression of street vendors has resumed, and there is no evidence that the KCCA will change its 
policies on street vending. Its structure and operation give it little reason to do so.  
 Relief for street vendors in Kampala will only come from more fundamental structural 
change. The KCCA in its present form is not designed and does not function in a way that 
prioritizes responsiveness to popular input. Street vendors require inclusive decision-making 
processes in order to thrive in urban environments; anything less leaves them vulnerable to the 
often unforgiving vagaries of state power and developmental ambitions. The politics of Kampala, 
of course, will continue to evolve, but whether or not this will happen in a way that again 
accommodates street vendors remains to be seen.  
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